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A parental seller with market power to some degree in its product market can earn rents. In 
this context, there is a gain to granting credit for the purchase of the product and thus the 
establishment of captive finance company for expanding the sales by offering loans to 
consumers who need financing for purchase of durable good. This paper examines the 
optimal behavior of such a durable good seller and its captive finance company when the 
consumer loan market is segmented into captive and independent lending institutions under 
imperfect but informative signal on borrower’s creditworthiness. The model presents that one 
critical difference for captive finance company will be its credit standard. Specifically, the 
model indicates that captive finance company will follow a more lenient credit standard, 
leading to the prediction that the likelihood of repayment of a captive loan is lower than that 
of a bank loan, other things equal. This prediction is tested using unique data sets drawn from 
a major credit bureau in the U.S. The analysis of credit bureau data shows that a captive 
automobile loan is less likely to be repaid than a bank automobile loan, which supports the 
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical analysis of risk segmentation of 
the consumer installment loan market by two different types of lending institutions – 
independent lending institutions and captive finance companies. A consumer installment loan 
is a credit arrangement repaid through periodic installment payments over a specific length of 
time. In general, consumer installment loans are used for financing the purchase of expensive 
durable goods. The good purchased serves as collateral for collection upon borrower’s 
default. Captive finance companies are the subsidiaries that finance the sales of automobiles 
of their parental automobile manufacturers. 
Several empirical papers have examined issues related to finance companies. Boczar 
(1978) empirically studied risk segmentation of consumer loan market on the basis of 
borrower risk characteristics. Data from a national survey of households are used to 
determine socio-economic and life-cycle characteristics of borrowers at banks and finance 
companies. In this paper, they find substantial overlap in borrower risk characteristics for the 
sampled households.  
Remolona et al. (1992) examine the differential performances of banks and finance 
companies in credit markets. They find that, in consumer loan markets, finance companies 
lost market share to banks and their affiliates while much of the finance company’s growth 
took place in niches, market segments of relatively risky credit where command of 
specialized information was critical to lending institutions. 
Carey et al. (1998) empirically examine the existence of specialization in private 
corporate loan market, extending the research on the public versus private debt distinctions. 
Comparing corporate loans made by commercial banks and finance companies, they find that 
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the two types of lending institutions are equally likely to finance information-problematic 
firms. However, finance companies tend to serve observably high-risk borrowers. They find 
that both regulatory and reputation-based explanations are significant for this specialization. 
Our paper differs from the above papers in its focusing on the secured automobile 
installment loan market, a market in which two types of lending institutions are involved in 
servicing such loans, banks and captive finance companies. A key feature of a captive 
finance company is that its credit decision takes into account not only the return from 
granting captive loans, but also the return from the sale of products purchased with captive 
loans.  We develop a theoretical model that incorporates this feature, and in doing so provide 
an explanation for the emergence of captive finance companies as well as a prediction 
regarding the risk segmentation of the auto loan credit market.
1   We then provide an 
empirical test of our theory using a unique data set that allows us to consider the differential 
performance of auto loans by the two different types of lenders. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a model where 
a bank (an independent lending institution) obtains an imperfect signal on the 
creditworthiness of a borrower, and makes a credit decision by setting optimal cutoff signal. 
Section 3 introduces a simple model of a firm’s expected demand for product in 
monopolistically competitive durable good market, assuming that consumers do not need 
financing for the purchase of durable goods.  Section 4 links the analysis of Sections 2 and 3 
by noting that the positive gain to the durable good seller from additional sales provides an 
                                                 
1 Jeong (2001) shows that differential screening technologies of banks and finance companies can lead to 
separation of consumer loan market, assuming that a bank has a better screening technology than that of a 
finance company.  However, given easy access to accurate and rich consumer credit history data in credit 
bureaus and quite standardized loan underwriting processes in real lending practices, one can hardly see 
whether there exist differential screening technologies across lending institutions of different types and how the 
differential screening technologies lead to separation in consumer loan market.  
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incentive to establish a captive finance company that offers loans to individuals who would 
not be provided such loans by independent lenders due to the risk of default.  In other words, 
the existence of positive rents for the durable good seller induces its captive finance company 
to set an optimal credit standard (cutoff signal) below the level lower of banks in equilibrium, 
resulting in risk segmentation of the consumer loan market by banks and captive finance 
companies. Section 4 also provides the numerical examples which implement the theoretical 
model of this paper, and those numerical examples describe the new equilibrium in 
monopolistically competitive durable good market with both banks and captive finance 
companies in comparison with the old equilibrium with only banks.   
Section 5 tests the prediction of the theoretical model using a unique data set, 
TrenData, drawn from a major credit bureau in the U.S., Trans Union. The analysis of 
credit bureau data shows that, as expected, a captive automobile loan is less likely to be 
repaid than a bank automobile loan. Section 6 summarizes and concludes.  
2.  A Simple Model of Credit Evaluation and Lending 
In this section, we present a simple model of credit rationing when a lending 
institution obtains an imperfect signal on the creditworthiness of a borrower who seeks 
financing of the purchase of a durable good.  For simplicity, we consider a two-period model.  
In the first period, a consumer applies for a loan at a lending institution of a particular type k  
to finance the purchase of a durable good.  If approved, the loan of amount l at loan rate i is 
offered by the lending institution.  In the second period, the consumer pays off the loan or 
defaults.  We consider two types of lending institutions – independent lending institutions or 
“banks” (denoted by the subscript B ) and captive finance companies (denoted by the 
subscript  ).  F
  4 
We assume that there is a fixed number, M, of potential consumers of the durable 
goods, each planning to purchase one unit. In the entire discussion of this paper, we assume 
that M  is fixed, that all M consumers require financing to purchase the durable good, and 
that the durable good purchased serves as collateral.  If a borrower defaults, the durable good 
has salvage value, and the lending institution takes collection activity to recover the 
remaining value of the collateral. 
We assume that there are two types of consumers seeking a loan: consumers who will 
pay off the loan – the low-risk loan applicants (denoted by subscript L) and consumers who 
will default – the high-risk loan applicants (denoted by subscript H).  Let   denote 
the exogenous and known probability that a consumer seeking a loan from a lending 
institution will not default on a loan and 
( 0,1 γ ∈ )
( ) ( ) 10 γ −∈ , 1  denotes the exogenous and known 
probability that a consumer seeking a loan from a lending institution will default on a loan. 
Note that γ  and () 1 γ −  can be interpreted as the known proportions of low- and high-risk 
borrowers, respectively. 
A lending institution receives an imperfect but informative signal
2  on  the 
creditworthiness of a borrower, s . This signal summarizes observable characteristics of 
potential borrowers, mainly a borrower’s income and other factors such as asset holding, debt 
levels, type of debt, credit history, marital status, and employment status – all of which can 
be linked to the likelihood of loan repayment. If the loan applicant is low-risk, the signal s is 
drawn from the normal distribution, G  with  mean  () L s L µ  and  variance 
2 σ . If the loan 
                                                 
2 If borrowers possess private information distinguishing their own types and observe the differences in the loan 
approval rates of banks and captive finance companies, high-risk borrowers will choose the type of lending 
institutions offering higher loan approval rate. Then, the lending institutions will offer menu of loan contracts 
that can separate the types of borrowers.  
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applicant is high-risk, the signal is drawn from the normal distribution, G  with mean  () H s
H µ  and variance 
2 σ . Note that the variance, 
2 σ , is assumed to be fixed and identical in both 
distributions. We assume that G  first-order stochastically dominates G , such that 
low-risk loan applicants tend to generate higher signals on average, or 
() L s () H s
L H µ µ > . 
ˆ s
) k
The decision of a lending institution of type k to approve or reject a loan applicant 
depends on its optimal cutoff signal,  .  If the signal obtained for the loan applicant is above 
the chosen cutoff signal, s , the lending institution grants the loan.  If the signal obtained is 
less than s , the lending institution rejects the loan applicant.  We will refer to s  as 
indicative of the credit standard of a lending institution of type  , and assume that this cutoff 
signal is not publicly observable.  If a consumer is not approved for a loan, it is assumed that 
this rejection precludes the consumer from obtaining a loan at other lending institutions, and 






A lending institution can err in evaluating a loan applicant in two ways - it can reject 
a low-risk loan applicant who will repay the loan or it can approve a loan to a high-risk loan 
applicant who will subsequently default. The rejection of a low-risk loan applicant is a Type I 
error and the granting a loan to a high-risk loan applicant is a Type II error.  For a given 
cutoff signal, s , the lending institution of type k   rejects a low-risk loan applicant with 
probability 
ˆk
( ˆ L Gs and grants a loan to a high-risk borrower with probability  ( ) ˆ 1 H k Gs − .  
                                                 
3 This assumption is strong, and is adopted to simplify the analysis.  We could instead assume that a consumer 
who is denied for a loan at a lending institution of a particular type can apply, at some cost, for a loan at a 
second lending institution. The result would be a type of "winner’s curse" in lending.  In particular, if credit 
evaluation is imperfectly correlated across lending institutions and each lending institution is unaware of 
whether a borrower has been rejected by other lending institution(s), then the pool of borrowers will worsen.  If 
lending institutions do know whether a borrower has been rejected at other lending institution(s), lending 
institutions may not be willing to lend to borrowers who have been previously rejected, and the result would be 
similar to our assumption that a consumer not approved for a loan does not buy the good. 
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Thus, an increase in s  raises the likelihood of type I errors, but reduces the likelihood of 
type II errors. 
ˆk
()
                  
  We assume that lending institutions operate in a perfectly competitive consumer loan 
market and hence take the loan rate i as given.  Lending institutions incur a common cost of 
funds r.
4 Lending institutions earn net return ( ) ir −  for each borrower who pays off the loan. 
If the borrower defaults, the lending institution obtains the return ( ) rd − , where d  reflects 
the return from the collection of salvage value of collateral, net of collection costs
5.  
The expected profits from granting a loan of amount l to a borrower is then given 
by
6: 
(1)   ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ 11 Bk Lk Hk si r l G s i r l G s r d πγ γ γ =−− −− − − −   l . 
 
 
According to equation (1), the best possible outcome,  ( ) ir l γ − , is reduced by 
expected losses associated with Type I errors,  ( ) L Gir l γ − , and by expected losses associated 
with Type  II errors, () [ ]( ) 11 H Gr d γ −− − l . This setup makes it clear that the return to 
evaluating a loan applicant and making a loan is the expected returns of making the best 
decision minus the costs of errors.  In the analysis to follow, we assume that the costs of 
these errors are such that it would not be optimal for the lender to adopt the simple rule of not 
                                
4 The cost of funds appears to have been very similar for banks and finance companies. Finance companies 
raise funds largely by issuing CPs and corporate bonds, while banks raise funds by issuing large CDs. To 
illustrate, the average interest rate on 3-month CPs over 1998-2002 period is 4.454%. During the same period, 
commercial banks issued their CDs at an average 3-month interest rate of 4.540%.  
5 We assume that the collection rates are identical for both types of lending institutions. This assumption is 
reasonable in that lending institutions usually sell the unpaid debts to collection companies. The collection 
companies conduct the identical collection activities regardless of the types of lending institutions from which 
they purchased unpaid debts. In Besanko and Thakor (1987), collateral is used as a screening device under 
asymmetric information. This paper does not model this way. 
6 Later, we assume that the loan amount, l , equals the price of the durable goods, p, for which the consumers 
obtain financing.  No down payment is assumed in the model, although inclusion of a common down payment 
would not change the conclusions of the model. 
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evaluating loan applicants in favor of either always rejecting or always accepting loan 
applicants. 



















  −− 




The optimal cutoff signal equates the expected gain to increasing s   in terms of 
decreasing the likelihood of approving a high-risk loan applicant with the expected costs of 
becoming more selective in terms of increasing the likelihood of rejecting a low-risk loan 
applicant. That is, the optimal cutoff signal is determined by the expected losses from type I 
and type II errors.  
ˆk
An important feature of the optimal cutoff signal s   is its relationship to the 
probability of default,  , where the probability of default among approved loan 
applicants for lending institution of type   is given by: 
ˆk
() ˆk s δ
k
(3)   ()
() ( )













 −−  =
  −+ − −   
 
Note that an increase in s  tends not only to reduce the number of consumers approved for 
loans, but also to reduce the probability of default, 
ˆk
( ) ˆk s δ , for those who are given a loan or  
() ˆˆ / kk ss δ ∂∂ 0 < . Note that, given the optimal cutoff signal,  , the increase in the proportion 
of high-risk borrowers will reduce the probability of default or  
ˆk s
( ) ˆ /0 k s δγ ∂ ∂<
7.  
                                                 
7 This comparative static result has an implication on the empirical analysis. Noting that the relative proportions 
of low- or high-risk borrowers in a region indicate the regional average riskiness of borrowers, regional average 
credit score can be a proxy for the relative proportions of γ  and ( ) 1 γ − . 
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3.  A Monopolistically Competitive Durable Goods Market with Only Banks 
In this section, we define a firm’s expected demand in monopolistically competitive 
durable good market under the assumption that consumers finance the purchase of durable 
goods only through banks. Recall that there are fixed number, M , of consumers that require 
financing for the purchase of the durable goods. When only banks operate in the consumer 
loan market, the likelihood a consumer is approved for a loan at a bank is  , where:  () ˆB As
(4)   () () ( ) ( ) ˆˆ 11 1 BL B H As G s G s γγ =− + − −     ˆ B  
0
 
and ∂ . Thus, the total number of consumers who can finance the purchase of a 
durable good, given only bank lending is available, is given by: 
() ˆˆ / As s ∂ <
(5)   () ˆ BB M As M = . 
We assume that there are   firms selling differentiated products in monopolistically 
competitive durable good market, and that these firms incur identical marginal production 
cost  , and fixed cost, F . Each of the 
N
κ B M   effective purchases of the durable good, 
1 ..., B ,2, j M =
()
, attaches different relative values to these products. Following Perlof and 
Salop (1985), we assume that each consumer’s valuation of the product of each firm can be 
viewed as independently drawn from the common distribution function Fv with density 
function 
()
f v . Given prices p ( 12 , ,..., ) N p p = p  for the   available differentiated products, 
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A particular consumer j’s net surplus to purchasing from firm i given the consumer's 
valuation is given by: 
(6)   .  ij ij i bvp =−
where   is  j's surplus from purchasing firm i ’s product, v  is  j's valuation of firm i ’s 
product, and 
ij b ij
i p   is the price of firm ’s product. If b   for a given consumer, then 
, and the consumer will choose to purchase from firm i over firm k. The 
probability that this occurs (i.e., b ) is 
i
kj b
ij ≥ kj b
kj i vp p k ≤− ij v +
ij ≥ ( ) ( ) kj i ij bb p v − + Pr .  ij k p F ≥=
  Since valuations are identically and independently distributed for consumers and 
firms, the proportion of consumers who purchase firm  ’s durable good is given by:  i
(7)   ( ) () ( Pr max ik k i ki ki bb F p p v d F v
≠ ≠ ≥= Π − +   ∫ ) d v
) N
  
It follows that the expected demand for durable good sold by firm i , 
, equals the proportion of consumers who buy that product given by 
equation (7) times the number of consumers 
( 12 , ,..., ,..., ii Dpp p p




12 , ,..., ,..., Pr max
()
ii N B i k ki
Bk i ki
Dpp p p M b b




=Π − +   ∫
 
Under the assumption that each firm has the identical and constant marginal cost, κ , 
its expected profits of firm   are given by:  i
(9)   () ( ) ( ) 12 12 , ,..., ,..., , ,..., ,..., ii N i ii N p ppp p D p ppp κ Π= − F −  
where   is the common level of fixed costs (entry costs) of each firm.  F
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We consider the case where a single symmetric equilibrium price exists such that 




8. Following Perlof and Salop (1985), this implies an expected demand 
of firm   given by: 




ii i Dp p p p M Fpp v fv d v
−
=− +   ∫  
Under the Bertrand-Nash assumption that firms choose price to maximize expected 
profits, taking other firms’ prices as given, firm i's first-order condition with respect to  i p  is 
given by: 




















Given the form of expected demand (10), we obtain the following characterization for 
the optimal price at durable good seller I : 
(12)                  
() ()








MF v f v d v
p









                            





NN Fv fv d v
κ − =+
−     ∫
9 
 
Equation (11) characterizes the symmetric optimal price for durable goods which lies 
strictly above the competitive price ( i p κ = , 1,2,..., iN ∀ = ). In monopolistically competitive 
durable good market, a zero-profit equilibrium is characterized by the usual Chamberlainian 
                                                 
8 Perlof and Salop (1985) show that, given identical marginal and fixed costs of firms, the market equilibrium 
has all firms charging a unique single-price equilibrium.  See Perlof and Salop (1985) for details regarding the 
form of the demand function and further discussion characterizing the market equilibrium. 
9 For instance, when   is assumed to be uniformly distributed, i.e.,  v ( ) 1/ f v = q
1 ) − N
 over the finite support, [0 , 
and 0 otherwise, we can easily show that 
, ] q
() () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22 22
00 /1 / 1 / 1 / (
qq N N Fv fv d v vq q d v q N
− − ==     ∫∫ . Hence, pq / κ = + .  Note that q and 
 indicate the degree of product differentiation and degree of market concentration, respectively.   1/N
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tangency of demand curve with average cost.  Since all firms are identical, the expected 
demand at each firm is given by  () ( ) ˆ / B As M N M N = / B  and the zero-profit condition is: 
N











Equations (12) and (13) characterize the unique zero-profit symmetric equilibrium 
price of durable goods and number of sellers in the monopolistically competitive durable 
good market when only banks exist to finance consumer purchases. We denote the 
equilibrium price and number of firms by p  and  , respectively. Finally, a perfectly 
competitive consumer loan market among banks implies an interest rate such that the 
expected incremental net return to a consumer loan for a bank is zero. The equilibrium bank 
loan rate i  thus satisfies the following zero-profit condition of each bank in the perfectly 
competitive consumer loan market: 
(14)            () () () ( ) () ( ) () ˆˆ ˆ 11 BB LB HB sli rG s i r G sr d πγ γ γ  =− − − − − − −    0 =  
4.  Emergence of Captive Finance Companies 
In this section, we consider the emergence of captive finance companies and risk 
segmentation by banks and captive finance companies in the consumer automobile loan 
market. In doing so, we explain why the credit standard of a captive finance company is 
lower than that of a bank, leading to the prediction that the likelihood of repayment of 
captive finance loans is lower than that for bank loans. 
To model the co-existence of banks and captive finance companies in the consumer 
loan market where banks are already established, we first need to examine why captive 
finance companies would emerge. One incentive for a captive finance company to emerge in 
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the consumer loan market is that a durable good firm can increase expected combined profits 
if it grants captive loans to consumers who might not be able to get loans from banks. 
Suppose that initially there are no captive finance companies.  Now let there be a 
deviant durable good seller that institutes a captive loan finance company and offers the same 
interest rate as banks.  
We assume that there are no additional fixed costs for establishing a captive finance 
company. Given the perfectly competitive loan rate, i , the equilibrium number of firms, N , 
and the symmetric zero-profit equilibrium price of durable goods,  p , the initial deviant firm 
maximizes its expected combined profits from selling product and granting captive loans by 
choosing optimal cutoff signal.   
We assume that the optimal cutoff signals of different types of lending institutions are 
not publicly observable, and that consumers randomly select the types of lending institutions 
of different types -   of the  ( 0,1 α ∈ ) M  consumers who demand the product of this durable 
good seller would select the captive finance company and ( ) ( ) 10 α −∈ , 1  of M  consumers 
would select a bank for financing. Thus, there are ( ) ( )( ) ˆ / B M N 1 As α −  consumers approved 
by banks and  () ( ˆDEV As M ) / N α   consumers approved by the captive finance company, 
where  ˆDEV s  is the optimal cutoff signal for loan approval for the captive finance company of 
the deviant durable good seller. 
The expected combined profits of the initial deviant seller which establishes its own 
captive finance company is given by: 
(15)  () () ( ) ()( ) ()( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 1 DEV B DEV F DEV
MM
sA s p A s p s
NN
ακ α κ π   Π= − − + − + −      
F  
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where  () () ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ˆˆ ˆ 11 F DEV L DEV H DEV s p ir G s ir Gs r d πγ γ γ  =− − − − − − −   
ˆ
 denotes 
the profits of the captive finance company given the optimal cutoff signal of the initial 
deviant  DEV s . 
The initial deviant will establish a captive finance company and grant captive loans if 
and only if its expected combined profits as defined by (15) are larger than the expected 
profits from selling the products when all consumers obtain loans only from the banks. By 
taking a difference between (13) and (15), this holds if and only if: 
(16)   () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ 0 DEV B DEV F DEV pA sA s A s s κπ −− +   >
ˆ
 
Note that if  ˆ DEV B s = s
=
, such that the captive finance company mimics the acceptance criterion 
of banks, then given    (zero-profit condition for banks) and ∂∂  
(optimal-cutoff condition for banks), it follows that there would be gains to the deviant 
having a less restrictive cutoff signal.   
() ˆ 0 B s π = () ˆˆ /0 BB ss π
In particular, at  ˆˆ DEV B ss = : 

















Equation (17) indicates that the optimal cutoff signal for the captive finance company 
of the deviant is below the optimal cutoff signal of a bank or  ˆ DEV B ss < . Given the zero-profit 
loan interest rate, i ,  ˆˆ DEV B s < s  implies  ( ) ˆ 0 FD E V s π < . A lower cutoff signal will increase 
sales of the deviant, and each additional sale generates positive profits given the positive 
markup on the durable good, () κ −> 0 p . Of course, at some point the gains to the additional 
sales are countered by losses on loans, and this limits the size of the reduction in the cutoff 
signal for the captive finance company. At the optimal cutoff point, the increase in expected 
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profits derived by granting additional loans, ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆˆ 0 DEV B pA sA s κ − −   >   , outweighs the 
expected losses from the captive loans,  ( ) ( ) ˆˆ 0 DEV F DEV s π As < , resulting in the increase in 
expected combined marginal profits,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ˆ ˆ 0 DEV F DEV s A s s κπ ˆˆ DEV B pA sA  − −+   > 
10. 
Note that  () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ˆ 0 DE F DEV pA s ˆˆ ˆ V B DEV sA s A s κπ −− +     implies 
()ˆ () FD E V ps κπ −+ >   0 .  
α
> 
The above discussion supports the emergence of captive finance companies for 
durable good sellers. We now characterize the equilibrium in monopolistically competitive 
durable goods market when all of the symmetric durable good sellers operate their captive 
finance companies in the consumer loan market, taking as given the proportion of consumers 
who apply to the captive finance company for a loan,  , the proportion of consumers who 
apply to banks for a loan, () 1 α − , cost of funds, r , and net return on collection, d , 
associated with a competitive banking sector. Both banks and captive finance companies take 
the zero-profit equilibrium interest rate, i , as given and fixed in the perfectly competitive 
consumer loan market.   
In this new equilibrium with both banks and captive finance companies operating in 
the perfectly competitive consumer loan market, the symmetric zero-profit equilibrium price 
of durable goods,  ˆ p , the symmetric zero-profit equilibrium number of durable sellers, N , 
and the optimal cutoff signal of a captive finance company, s , are related. Further, the 
Chamberlinian tangency condition does not apply since the expected profits of a firm with a 
ˆ
ˆF
                                                 
10 Gilligan and Smirlock (1983) show that, in order to maximize the value of the firm, a multiproduct firm can 
obtain revenues in excess of production costs on goods sold in monopolized market and uses these rents to 
subsidize the production of goods sold in competitive markets.   
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captive finance company include not only profits from selling the product, but also the losses 
to granting captive loans.  
  Since the consumers randomly select the types of lending institutions, the zero-profit 
symmetric equilibrium in monopolistically competitive durable good market is characterized 
by:  
(18)  ()( )() ()( ) ()( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 10 ˆˆ FB F F F
MM
sA s p A s p s
NN
ακ ακ π   Π= − − + − + − =      
F . 
Note that ˆ p  and   are  subject  to  ˆF s ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 FB F F F pA s A s A ss κπ − −+   > , 
which is the necessary and sufficient condition of the emergence and operation of each 
captive finance company.    
Each durable good firm and its captive finance company jointly set the cutoff signal 
to maximize the expected combined profits from selling products and granting captive loans 
to consumers. Given the perfectly competitive loan rate, i , a symmetric zero-profit 
equilibrium price of durable goods,  ˆ p , and the optimal cutoff signal of a captive finance 



































   −+
−−   
 −   




Equation (19) characterizes the optimal cutoff signal of a captive finance company in 
the equilibrium when both banks and captive finance companies operate in the consumer 
loan market. The optimal cutoff signal of a captive finance company is determined by the 
losses from type I and type II errors. For a durable good seller, the relative cost of a type I 
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error (rejecting a low-risk borrower) compared to a type II error (accepting a high-risk 
borrower) is higher than for banks, as the durable good seller makes profits on additional 
sales of the product while the profit from selling additional products subsidizes lending on 
the side of captive finance company, i.e.,  ( ) ( ) ˆˆ 0 FF ps κπ − +>
B
B
   where  . Thus, 
the durable good seller will have lower standards for credit approval than that of a bank or 
. Given the inherent relationship between the optimal cutoff signal and expected 
default rate as shown in equation (3), we have the following proposition.  
() ˆ 0 FF s π <
ˆˆ F ss <
 
Proposition 1: With  , expected default rate of a captive loan is higher than expected 
default rate of a bank loan or 
ˆˆ F ss <
() ( ) ˆˆ FB ss δδ > .  
  
Given the optimal cutoff signal of a captive finance company,  , the loan approval 
rate of a captive finance company is given by: 
ˆF s
(20)    () () ( ) ( ) ˆˆ 11 1 FL F H G s G s γγ =− + − −     ˆ F   As  
Thus, the total number of consumers who can finance the purchase of a durable good 
from captive finance companies is given by: 
(21)    FF () ˆ M As M = . 
Note that  () ( ) ˆˆ FF BB M As M M As M => = since  ˆˆ F ss B < . When consumers obtain 
financing only from banks, each seller has an equal expected demand,  () () ˆ / B M N As . 
However, when banks and captive finance companies co-exist in the consumer loan market 
and consumers are randomly allocated across lending institutions (we assume that proportion 
() 1 α −  of  M consumers select banks while proportion α  of  M consumers select captive 
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finance companies), each durable good seller has an equal expected demand for its 
differentiated products,  () ( ) ( ) ( ) () ˆˆ ˆˆ 1/ 1 BF B F As As M N M M N αα α α −+ = − +  
() ( )
 . Thus, 
since  , more consumers are approved for loans than when only banks operate, and the 
total number of durable good buyers increases with the introduction of captive finance 
companies or 
ˆˆ F ss <
( ) ( )( ) ˆˆ 11 BF B F ˆ BB M As
BF M α
(
M M M As M As M αα α α =< − + = − +    
 
( ) () ()
)( ) () ()
  .  
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( ) 1/ f vq =
/ pq N κ =+ N , ] q
/   
B
With the new aggregate number of consumers who can purchase durable goods, 
, given the economy-wide operation of both banks and captive finance 
companies in the consumer loan market, we obtain the following characterization for the 
optimal price at durable good seller i: 
1
(22)            
                    =+
11 
 
Equations (18), (19), and (22) characterize the unique symmetric zero-profit 
equilibrium price of differentiated durable goods, p , the unique symmetric zero-profit 
equilibrium number of sellers, N , and the optimal cutoff signal of a captive finance 
company,  , when both banks and captive finance companies operate to finance consumer 
purchases in the perfectly competitive consumer loan market.  
11 As shown in footnote 9, when v  is assumed to be uniformly distributed, i.e.,   over the finite 
support, [0 , and 0 otherwise, , where q and 1/  indicate the degree of product differentiation 
and degree of market concentration, respectively. The optimal price of a durable good seller is not affected by 
the number of consumers.    
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It is worthwhile to discuss the comparison of the new equilibrium with both banks 
and captive finance companies with the old equilibrium with only banks in terms of the 
unique symmetric zero-profit equilibrium price of durable goods and number of durable good 
sellers.  
Table 1 in the Appendix provides the results of numerical examples. In the numerical 
examples, we restrict our attention to the symmetric zero-profit equilibrium where 
( ) () () () ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 FB F F F pA s A s A ss κ −− +   π >   holds, which is the necessary and sufficient 
condition of the emergence of captive finance companies in our model. As shown in the 
numerical examples in Table 1, note that, in the new equilibrium of monopolistically 
competitive durable good market with both banks and captive finance companies, each 
durable good seller without having established its captive finance company makes negative 
profits from selling durable goods in monopolistically competitive durable good market.  
The numerical examples in Table 1 show that, as described in Proposition 1, the 
optimal credit standard of a captive finance company is more lenient than that of a bank for 
the symmetric zero-profit equilibrium prices of durable goods corresponding to various 
parametric specifications of the proportion of borrowers selecting captive finance companies, 
α . Accordingly, the loan approval rates of a captive finance company and the default 
probability of its captive loan are higher than that of a bank and its bank loan, respectively.  
The numerical examples also show that, for various parametric specifications of α , 
the unique symmetric zero-profit equilibrium prices of durable goods are lower when both 
banks and captive finance companies operating in the consumer loan market than that when 
only banks operating, and that the unique symmetric zero-profit equilibrium numbers of 
durable good sellers are greater when both banks and captive finance companies operating in 
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the consumer loan market than that when only banks operating. We have Proposition 2 as 
following.  
 
Proposition 2:  ˆ p p <  and  ˆ NN >  for various parametric specifications of α .  
   
Further, the numerical examples show that the decrease in equilibrium price of 
durable goods, the increase in equilibrium number of durable good sellers, and the increase in 
the optimal cutoff signal of a captive finance company as more borrowers select captive 
finance companies or α  increases.  
Table 1 shows that, with the economy-wide operation of captive finance companies, 
the total number of consumers approved for loans either from banks or from captive finance 
companies is higher than the total number of consumers approved for loans when only bank 
financing is available.   
5. Empirical  Analysis 
The main prediction of the theoretical model of this paper is that a durable good loan 
from a captive finance company is less likely to be repaid than a bank loan due to optimal 
lower credit standards for captive finance companies. In this section, we focus on empirical 
examination of this theoretical prediction focusing on automobile loans. The automobile 
industry matches our theoretical model in two key respects. First, automobiles can be 
considered to be a monopolistically competitive (differentiated) durable goods that usually 
require financing, mainly a consumer installment loan.  Second, most of major domestic and 
foreign automobile manufacturers have developed their captive finance companies, and 
consumers obtain loans from either banks or these captive finance companies. 
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  Our empirical analysis relies on a unique database, TrenData of Trans Union, to 
empirically examine the repayment performances of bank and captive automobile loans, 
controlling for other factors that can also affect delinquency rates.  Recent studies such as 
Barron, Elliehausen, and Staten (2000), Barron, Staten, and Wilshusen (2002), and Gross and 
Souleles (2002) show that delinquency rates of various types of consumer loans are 
significantly related to the factors such as income, consumer debt burden, change in debt 
levels, and employment status. We adopt those determinants for the estimation of the 
delinquency rates of automobile loans and estimate the statistical significance of those by 
panel regression analysis. 
Note that, different from the measure of loan performances in theoretical model (the 
expected default rate), we use delinquency rates of automobile loans to measure loan 
performances.  However, previous studies such as DeVaney and Lytton (1995) and Gross 
and Souleles (2002) show that delinquency rates are important indicator of quality of loan 
performances. 
The variables in the TrenData of Trans Union are measured at the county level, 
covering 3,141 counties in the U.S. The variables include the number of delinquencies of 
automobile loans of banks and captive finance companies and the number of automobile 
loans of banks and captive finance companies. Table 3 summarizes the details of selected 
variables from the TrenData of Trans Union. We construct the variables for the 
performances of automobile loans of banks and captive finance companies using the 
variables in the TrenData of Trans Union. Table 3 also summarizes the details of the 
constructed variables for loan performances. 
To construct the variables for consumers’ characteristics, this paper uses the data 
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from TrenData of Trans Union and the data from government economic databases such as, 
Regional Data from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 1998-2001, 1990 and 2000 Census 
Data of Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1996 Current Population Surveys (CPS) Displaced 
Workers, Job Tenure, and Occupational Mobility Survey, and March Current Population 
Surveys of Bureau of Labor Statistics. Table 4 summarizes the sources for selected variables.  
 
The construction of the variables is described as follows: 
 
Measure of Performances of Bank and Captive Automobile Loans: Delinquency rates of bank 
and captive automobile loans are used as measures of loan performances. The delinquency 
rates are calculated by taking the ratios of the number of delinquencies to the number of 
granted loans. Using the TrenData of Trans Union, we obtain the delinquency rates of 
automobile loans of banks and captive finance companies.    
 
Measure of Income: Consumer income is a key variable indicating the ability of borrower’s 
loan repayment. County-average real per capital personal income is used in the estimations of 
delinquency rates. We obtained the income data from Regional Data from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) 1998-2001.   
 
Borrowr Assets: Borrower assets serve as a cushion against income and expenditure shocks 
since household assets indicate the ability of refinancing for repaying loans when borrowers 
are in financial distress because the household assets can be used as collateral for 
refinancing. Consumers can avoid short-term liquidity problems and delinquencies by 
refinancing by using borrower assets. Borrower assets also serve as an equity which can be 
given up for collection by a lending institution upon borrower’s default, which may reduce a 
borrower’s tendency to become delinquent. Consumer assets enter the estimated equation in 
the form of the state-level median value of housing as reported by the 2000 Census. The 
2000 state-level median house values are converted into nominal house values of a specific 
year using the consumer price index.  
 
Unemployment and Cushion against Income and Expense Shocks: An income shock can arise 
mainly from loss of employment. The unemployment rates of the U.S. states reported by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) are used to indicate income shock from unemployment. Job 
tenure can indicate the stability of employment status, which is a cushion against adverse 
income and expense shocks. We obtain regional job tenure data from 1996 Current 
Population Surveys (CPS) Displaced Workers, Job Tenure, and Occupational Mobility 
Survey.  
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Measure of Expenditure Shock to Borrowers: Expenditure shocks to borrowers can make it 
more likely for a household to become delinquent. DeVaney and Lytton (1995) show that 
divorce/separation is an important factor that impacts the repayment performances of 
consumer loans. We obtain state-level data for the proportion of adults who are divorced and 
separated from 1990 and 2000 Census Data, U.S. Bureau of Census.  
 
Measure of Regional Average Borrower Riskiness: County-average credit score indicates              
a county-wide average riskiness of borrowers. That is, county-average credit core can be 
interpreted as indicative of the relatively higher proportion of low-risk borrowers. We obtain 
the county-average credit scores from the TrenData of  Trans Union. 
 
Measure of Other Debt: Amounts of debts held by a borrower will have a strong impact upon 
repayment of loans. Total debt level per borrower
12 can indicate a consumer’s debt burden. 
Given this total debt level per borrower, the increase in revolving debt can dilute a 
borrower’s resources to repay automobile loan. Since the revolving loan is unsecured credit 
arrangements of which credit limits have been raised without strict credit evaluations, the 
debt burdens of revolving loans easily accumulate. Then, the increase in the proportion of 
revolving debt to total debt
13   could turn away borrowers’ resources from repaying 
automobile loans to repaying revolving debts. From the TrenData of Trans Union, we obtain 
total debt per borrower and change in the proportion of revolving debt to total debt.    
 
Using the variables constructed above, we test the hypotheses as follow: 
 
Hypothesis 1: County delinquency rates of captive consumer automobile loans are higher 
than those of bank consumer automobile loans.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Counties with higher real per capita personal income will have lower 
delinquency rates. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Higher delinquency rates are more likely in the counties with higher level of 
unemployment rate, and higher divorce/separation rates, which indicate the prevalence of 
income and expense shocks, respectively.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Counties with higher total debt per borrower and higher increase in the 
proportion of revolving debt to total debt are likely to have higher delinquency rates of 
automobile loans.  
 
                                                 
12 Using TrenData of Trans Union, total debt level per borrower is calculated by AT33/AT12C. AT33 is the 
sum of amounts owed on all open accounts which have been verified or reported in the past 12 months. AT33 
includes the amounts of mortgage debts. AT12C is the total number of consumers (borrowers) with at least one 
account verified or reported in the past 12 months.  
13 Using TrenData of Trans Union, the proportion of revolving debt to total debt is calculated by RE33/AT33. 
RE33 is the sum of amounts owed on all open revolving accounts which have been verified or reported in the 
past 12 months. AT33 is the sum of amounts owed on all open accounts which have been verified or reported in 
the past 12 months. AT33 includes the amounts of mortgage debts. 
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Hypothesis 5: Higher county-average credit score indicates higher proportion of low-risk 
borrowers. Thus, counties with higher county-average credit scores will have lower 
delinquency rates.   
 
 
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics of the variables for county-wide average 
borrower characteristics. Table 6 provides the correlation coefficients between variables. 
Most of the relationships have desired signs. Table 7 provides the descriptive statistics of the 
delinquency rates of bank and captive automobile loans and the results of T-tests for mean 
differences between delinquency rates for each year from 1999 to 2002. Table 7 shows that 
the delinquency rates of captive automobile loans are higher than those of bank loans. The 
differences in means of delinquency rates of bank and captive loans are statistically 
significant. Over the period from 1999 to 2002, Table 7 shows that the delinquency rates of 
both bank and captive loans increase over 1999-2000 period and then fall over 2001-2002 
period.  
We conduct a panel regression analysis to estimate the determinants of county-level 
delinquency rates from 1999 to 2002. Table 8 displays the results of the model’s estimation 
of delinquency rates of bank and captive automobile loans for the period 1999 to 2002.  
Column 1 of Table 8 lists the predicted signs for the coefficients as discussed in hypotheses. 
Column 2 provides estimates for a random effects model specification. Random effects 
model for explaining the variation in delinquency rates across counties and over time can be 
decomposed into two components. One part considers variation in each county’s delinquency 
rate from its average rate; the second part considers variation in the average delinquency 
rates of automobile loans across counties. The first component of the random effects model is 
fixed-effects estimator, also known as the “within estimator”. The second component of the 
random effects model, referred to as the “between estimator”, focuses on explaining 
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differences in average delinquency rates across counties. Random effects model considers 
separate cross-sectional error term, and owing to this intrapanel variation, the random effects 
model has the distinct advantage of allowing for time-invariant variables to be included 
among the regressors.   
Finally, column 3 reports estimation results for a fixed effects model specification 
that explores the correlation between deviations in a county’s delinquency rate of automobile 
loans from the county average and deviations in the independent variables from their county 
averages over the 4-year time period
14.  
The results of random and fixed effects models are very similar and largely consistent 
with the hypothesized relationships. Random and fixed effects model show similar goodness 
of fits. As for specification tests, as shown in Table 8, Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier 
statistic for testing random effects model against classical ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model (fixed effects model in Table 8) shows that the random effects model is 
better than OLS or fixed effects model. F-statistic for the fixed effects model shows that 
overall significance of estimated coefficients are jointly significant.  
As for local economic factors, counties with higher average real per capita income 
had lower delinquency rates, and higher housing values reduced the likelihood of a becoming 
delinquent in repaying automobile loans. Higher credit score reduced the delinquency rates. 
The increase in credit scores reduces the delinquency rate. Random and fixed effects model 
show that higher county-level riskiness indicated by county-average credit scores raises 
delinquency rates of automobile loans. The county-average credit scores can be a proxy for 
                                                 
14 A constant coefficient model (or pooled regression model) with residual homogeneity and normality can be 
estimated with ordinary least squares estimation (OLS). As long as there is no groupwise or other 
heteroskedastic effects on the dependent variable, OLS may be used for fixed effects model as well (Sayrs, L. 
Pooled Time Series Analysis, Newbury Park, Ca: Sage (1989), pp. 10 -32).  
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the relative proportions of low- and high-risk borrowers in each region (γ  and  () 1 γ −  
respectively in the analytical model).   
  Consumer decisions to take on higher debt burdens clearly contributed to the increase 
in delinquency rates of automobiles loans. Holding income and other factors constant, higher 
total debt levels per borrower were associated with higher delinquency rates at the county 
level. In addition, the type of debt mattered as well. Delinquency rates of automobile loans 
rose along with the increase in proportion of revolving debt to total debt. 
As for other local economic and demographic factors, higher delinquency rates were 
observed in counties with higher unemployment rate, lower employment tenure, and higher 
divorce/separation rates, all of which are proxies for the prevalence of either income or 
expense shocks. Year dummies reflect the actual trends in the change in the delinquency 
rates of automobile loans for the 1999-2002 time period. 
  The main test of this paper is on the dummy variables for lender type. Having 
controlled for other borrower characteristics, the dummy variables for lender type in both 
random and fixed effects models have positive signs as expected, and coefficients estimated 
are statistically significant, implying that captive automobile loans are less likely to be repaid 
than bank automobile loans. These results are consistent with the results of T-tests for mean 
differences in Table 5.  
In sum, in both random and fixed effects models, all of the significant explanatory 
variables have coefficients estimated with the expected signs and most of the coefficients 
estimated are statistically significant. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper constructs a unique theoretical model to explain why captive finance 
companies emerge in the consumer loan market and why the credit standard of captive 
finance companies is more lenient than that of banks. The explanation relies on the additional 
rents extracted by offering captive loans to riskier consumers for durable good sellers 
operating in a monopolistically competitive industry. The gains to such sellers from the 
expansion of the sale of the durable good subsidize the losses on the lending side. The model 
predicts that a captive finance company sets more lenient credit standard than that of a bank, 
and that the likelihood of repayment of a captive loan is lower than that of a bank loan. 
The empirical analysis provides clear evidence that a captive automobile loan is less 
likely to be repaid than a bank automobile loan. These results verify the main theoretical 
prediction that a captive finance company’s credit standard is more lenient than that of a 
bank, which shows that the consumer automobile loan market in the U.S. is segmented by 
banks and captive finance companies on the basis of consumers’ risk characteristics.  
Although this paper makes a valuable contribution in that it clearly models the 
emergence of captive finance companies with a link to the monopolistically competitive 
durable good for which financing is required, and resulting risk segmentation of consumer 
loan market by banks and finance companies, there are limitations to the analysis. One main 
shortcoming is that this paper does not incorporate asymmetric information on the borrower’s 
ability of loan repayment into the model. Since it is prevailing phenomenon that borrowers 
have private information on their ability of loan repayment, the extension of this paper 
should analyze the effect of asymmetric information and borrower’s self-selection of the 
types of loan contracts and lending institutions on the equilibrium in loan market while each 
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borrower can observe differences in the terms of loan contracts, including credit standards, of 






















                                                 
15  Barron and Chong (2003) extend this paper, developing a model with asymmetric information on a 
borrower’s loan repayment ability and ex ante observability of credit standards.   
  28 
References 
Barron, John M. and Andrew B. Chong. “Asymmetric Information, Self-selection, and Risk 
Segmentation of Consumer Loan Market: A Simple Theory.” Working Paper (December 
2003), School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology-Sydney.  
Barron, John M., Michael E. Staten, and Stephanie M. Wilshusen. “The Impact of Casino 
Gambling on Personal Bankruptcy Filings.” Contemporary Economic Policy, (October 2002). 
Barron, John M. and Neven T. Valev. “International Lending by U.S. Banks.” Journal of 
Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol.32, No.3 (August 2000, Part I), 357- 381. 
 
Boczar, Gregory E. “Competition between Banks and Finance Companies: A Cross Section 
Study of Personal Loan Debtors.” Journal of Finance, Vol.33, No.1 (March 1978), 245 - 
258.  
 
Brueckner, Jan K. “Mortgage Default with Asymmetric Information.” Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, Vol.20, No.3 (2000), 251 – 274.  
 
Carey, Mark, Mitch Post, and Steven A. Sharpe. “Does Corporate Lending by Banks and 
Finance Companies Differ? Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting.” 
Journal of Finance, Vol.53, No.3 (June 1998), 845 - 878.  
 
DeVaney, Sharon A. and Ruth H. Lytton. “Household Insolvency: A Review of Household 
Debt Repayment, Delinquency, and Bankruptcy.” Financial Services Review, Vol.4, No.2 
(1995), 137 – 156.   
 
Devinney, Timothy M. “Rationing in a Theory of Banking Firm.” Studies in Contemporary 
Economics (1986), Springer-Verlag.  
 
Freixas, Xavier and Jean-Charles Rochet. “Microeconomics of Banking.” MIT Press (1999).  
 
Gilligan, Thomas W. and Michael L. Smirlock. “Predation and Cross-Subsidization in the 
Value of Maximizing Multiproduct Firm.” Southern Economic Journal, Vol.50 No.1 (July 
1983), 37 – 42.   
 
Gross, David B. and Nicholas S. Souleles. “An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy 
and Delinquency.” Review of Financial Studies, Vol.15, No.1, (Spring 2002), 319 – 347.  
 
Hogan, Warren. “The Future of Banking.” Economic Record, Vol.75, No.231 (1999), 417-
427.   
 
Hogan, Warren, Katherine Avram, Christine Brown, Deborah Ralston, Michael Skully, 
George Hempel, and Donald Simonson. “Management of Financial Institutions.” John Wiley 
& Sons Australia, Ltd. (1999). 
 
  29 
Jeong, H.K. “Essays on Banking: Screening Technology.” Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
Department of Economics, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University 
(December 2001).  
 
Perloff, Jeffrey M. and Steven C. Salop. “Equilibrium with Product Differentiation.” Review 
of Economic Studies, Vol.52, No.1 (January 1985), 107 – 120. 
 
Remolona, Eli M. and Kurt C. Wulfekuhler. “Finance Companies, Bank Competition, and 
Niche Markets.” The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Quarterly Review (Summer 1992), 
25 - 38. 
 
Saunders, Anthony and Marcia Cornett. “Financial Institutions Management: A Risk 
Management Approach.” McGraw-Hill/Irwin (2003).  
 
Staten, Michael E., Otis W. Gilley, and John R. Umbeck. “Information Costs and the 
Organization of Credit Markets: A Theory of Indirect Lending.” Economic Inquiry (1990), 
508 - 529. 
 
Stiglitz, Joseph and Andrew Weiss. “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 































Table 1 Equilibrium in Monopolistically Competitive Durable Good Market and Perfectly  
              Competitive  Consumer Loan Market: Numerical Examples 
 
                                        Variables 
 
 
           Values of Variables 
Parametric specifications of distribution of consumers, distribution functions of signal, and density 
function of consumer valuation of durable goods  
 
Proportions of low- risk borrowers, γ , and high-risk borrowers,( ) 1 γ − :  
 
           γ = ( ) 1 γ − = 0.5 
Means of the signals of low-risk borrowers,  L µ , and high-risk borrowers,  H µ
  
              L µ = 1,  H µ = -1 
Identical variance of distribution functions of signals of low- and high-risk borrowers: 
2 σ  
                     
                           2 
Finite support for uniform density function,  () f v , of consumer valuation of 
durable goods  
                  
                      [0,400] 
Parametric specifications of consumer loan market  
 
 
Cost of funds:    r
 
 
                    
                        0.045 
Net collection rate:    d
 
 
                    
                         0.01 
Parametric specifications of monopolistically competitive durable good market 
 
 
Parametrically Specified number of consumers: M  
 
 
                   
                       30,000 
Parametrically specified constant marginal costs of producing a durable good: κ  
 
 
                  
                       $9,000 
Parametrically specified fixed costs of producing durable goods:   F
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Symmetric zero-profit equilibrium in monopolistically competitive durable goods market and zero-
profit equilibrium in perfectly competitive consumer loan market with only banks 
 
Symmetric zero-profit equilibrium price of durable goods with only 
banks operating in consumer loan market:  p  
                   
                                        $9047.73 
Equilibrium number of sellers with only banks operating in 
consumer loan market:  N  
                    
                                          8.3814 
Zero-profit equilibrium lending rate: i  
 
                   
                                          0.0552 
Optimal cutoff signal:    ˆB s
 
                             
                                          1.2341 
Loan approval rate:    () ˆB As
 
                             
                                          0.2927 
Probability of default:  ˆ
B δ  
 
                   
                                          0.1320 
Symmetric zero-profit equilibrium in monopolistically competitive durable goods market and zero-
profit equilibrium in perfectly competitive consumer loan market with both banks and captive 
finance companies 
Given proportion of borrowers selecting captive finance 
companies: α   
 
 
    0.25                      0.5                         0.75                     1 
Symmetric zero-profit price of durable goods:  ˆ p  
 
               
 $9046.82           $9046.03                 $9045.32           $9044.67 
Symmetric zero-profit number of durable sellers:    ˆ N
 
 
  8.5427                8.6905                     8.8270               8.9539   
Optimal cutoff signal of captive finance company:    ˆF s
 
 
  0.3165                0.3270                     0.3366               0.3453 
Loan approval rate:    () ˆF As
 
               
  0.4445                0.4426                     0.4410               0.4395 
Probability of default:  ˆ
F δ  
 
 
  0.2871                0.2864                     0.2857               0.2851 
Profit from selling durable goods without establishing its captive 
finance company:   
() ( ) ( ) () ˆ ˆˆ 1/ B As p M N F ακ −− −  
 
-$13,902.7         -$26,746.6              -$38,730.1        -$50,000.0  
Losses per loan on lending:    () ˆF s π
 
 
-$11.1958         -$11.0179              -$10.85869         -$10.7147 
Necessary and sufficient condition for emergence of captive 
finance companies:   
( ) () () () ( ) ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 FB F F F pA s A s A ss κπ −− +   >  
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Table 1 Continued 
 
Number of consumers who are approved for loans, and who can purchase durable goods  
 
 
Given proportion of borrowers selecting captive finance 
companies: α   
 
 
    0.25                      0.5                         0.75                     1 
Number of consumers selecting banks and approved by banks, 
, when only banks operating   () ˆB As M
 
  
                                        8780.97 
Number of consumers selecting banks and approved by banks, 
, when both banks and captive finance 
companies operating 
() ( ) ˆ 1 B As M α −
 
  6,585.72            4,390.48                  2,195.24                 0  
Number of consumers selecting captive finance companies and 
approved by captive finance companies,  , when 
both banks and captive finance companies operating  
() ˆF As M α
 
  3,332.52            6,639.32                  9,921.59           13,183.51 
Total number of consumers approved by both banks and captive 
finance companies, () + ( ) ˆ 1 B As M α − ( ) ˆF As M α , 
when both banks and captive finance companies operating 
 



































  33 
Table 2  Definitions of Selected Variables from TrenData of Trans Union and Construction  of 
                Variables for Performances of Consumer Automobile Loans 
 
Definitions of Selected Variables in TrenData of Trans Union: 
Variables in terms of number of loans at the U.S. county-level: 1999 to 2002 
 
Selected Variables in  
TrenData  of Trans Union 
 




Number of bank automobile loan trades: 
Total number of all open bank automobile loan trades, verified or reported in the past 




Number of bank automobile loan trades currently 60 days+ past due: 
Total number of all open bank automobile loan trades, verified or reported in the past 




Number of captive automobile loan trades: 
Total number of all open captive automobile loan trades, verified or reported in the past 




Number of captive automobile loan trades currently 60 days+ past due: 
Total number of all open captive automobile loan trades, verified or reported in the past 
12 months, which are currently 60 days or greater past due.  
Construction of Variables for Loan Performances from TrenData of Trans Union: 
Variables in terms of delinquency rates at the U.S. county-level: 1999 to 2002 
 
(BADELQ+ CFDELQ)/ 
                      (BAUTO+CFAUTO) 
 
Ratio of number of bank and captive automobile loan trades currently 60 days+ past 
due to number of active bank and captive automobile loan trades 
BADELQ/BAUTO    Ratio of number of bank automobile loan trades currently 60 days+ past due to number 
of active bank automobile loan trades 
 
CFDELQ/CFAUTO    Ratio of number of captive automobile loan trades currently 60 days+ past due to 




Table 3  Variables for Borrower Characteristics and Data Sources  
                 Variable 
 
 
                                Source 
Annual county-level income 
 
 
Regional Data, 1998-2001, Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Dept. of 
Commerce. BLS CPI-U series is used to covert to real values. 
State-level median value of house 
 
 
2000 Census Data, U.S. Bureau of Census. State Census Data adjusted using BLS CPI 
Iindex 
 
Annual state-level unemployment rates 
 
 
Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 1998-2002, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).  
Annual state-level data on the proportion 
of adults divorced or separated 
 




Average tenure by area, Displaced worker survey, .Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).   
 
County-average credit score, Change in 
proportion revolving debt    to total debt, 
Total debt per borrower 
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Minimum Maximum   
County-average real per capita 
income  
 
U.S.$ 20,795  5,212  U.S.$ 4,962  U.S.$ 82,995 
State-average median house value 
  
 
U.S.$ 106,153  30,171  U.S.$68,401  U.S.$ 284,894 
County-average credit score 
 
 
679.2174 34.8779  508.6818 779.0 
Change in proportion of revolving 
debt    to total debt  
 
-1.0324% 14.9865  -82.9837%  306.0241% 
Total debt per borrower  
 
 
U.S.$30,733  14,682  U.S.$ 1,382  U.S.$ 137,462 
Average job tenure 
 
 
7.0773 years  2.0114  0.02 years  28.0 years 
State unemployment Rate  
 
 
4.4428%   1.4361  0.8523%  29.1952% 
State proportion of adults who are 
divorced/separate  
 
8.7730% 1.5690  0.4640% 21.2340% 
 
 
Table 5  Correlation Coefficients between Variables  
 
 Delinque-
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Table 6  Descriptive Statistics of Delinquency Rates of Bank and Captive Automobile Loans and 
               T-tests for Mean Differences of Delinquency Rates 
 
Delinquency Rates (%): 
Ratios of the number of automobile loans with 60+ days past due to the number of active automobile loans 
 








T-test for mean differences 
between delinquency rates 
of bank and captive 
automobile loans  
       Year 
 
 
         Mean 
      (Std.Dev.) 
          Mean 
       (Std.Dev.) 
       Mean 
     (Std.Dev.) 
      T-statistics 
        1999 
 
 
       1.3114% 
       (1.1040) 
         1.1869% 
         (1.4118) 
       1.3804% 
       (1.5044) 
       -5.66*** 
        2000 
 
 
       3.8260% 
       (2.5763) 
          3.0512% 
          (2.8135) 
       4.3700% 
       (3.38454) 
       -19.8417*** 
        2001 
 
 
       1.5054% 
       (1.1754) 
          1.3939% 
          (1.7308) 
       1.5858% 
       (1.5341) 
       -4.9691*** 
        2002 
 
 
       1.5521% 
       (1.1855) 
          1.2323% 
          (1.4549) 
       1.7061% 
       (1.5420) 
        -13.2077*** 
   All Years: 
   1999-2002 
 
       2.0485% 
       (1.9288) 
          1.7159% 
          (2.0866) 
       2.2601% 
       (2.4709) 
        -23.4248*** 
Note: 1) These T-tests consider the differences between the mean of delinquency rate of bank 
               automobile loans minus  the mean of delinquency rate of  captive automobile loans. 
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Table 7  Panel Regression for Estimation of Determinants of County Delinquency Rates of  
              Automobile Loans: 1999 to 2002 
 
  Predicted sign for effect 
on delinquency rates of 
automobile loans 
Random-effects model 
for log of delinquency 
rates of automobile loans 
Fixed-effects model for 
log of delinquency rates 




          Coefficient 
        (z-statistic) 
        Coefficient 




            933.8232*** 
           (3.209) 
      1282.0808*** 
         (7.397) 
Log of county-average real per 
capita income (lagged one year) 
                     
                   −  
          -131. 7690*** 
           (-2.590) 
       -40.1173 
        (-1.288) 
Log of state-average house value 
(lagged one year) 
 
                
                   −  
         -76.8880* 
           (1.822) 
        -67.5991*** 
         (-2.822) 
County-average credit score 
(lagged one year) 
 
 
                   −  
          -0.7559*** 
           (-8.562) 
        -2.0057*** 
         (-26.581) 
Change in proportion of revolving 
debt    to total debt  
(lagged one year) 
 
                   +  
           0.1246 
           (1.073) 
         1.1870*** 
         (10.196) 
Total debt per borrower 
(lagged one year) 
 
 
                   +  
           0.7567*** 
           (20.930) 
         0.8196*** 
         (37.023) 




                   −  
           -4.6382** 
           (-2.291) 
        -0.5539 
        (-0.489) 
          
State unemployment Rate 
(lagged one year) 
 
 
                   +  
           7.1093*** 
           (3.933) 
         9.5835*** 
         (5.771) 




                   +  
           804.0422*** 
           (4.015) 
         1142.5720*** 
         (7.688) 
         
Lender type dummy: 
= 1 if captive loan 
= 0 if bank loan 
              
                   +  
            66.1630*** 
            (18.117) 
         66.1630*** 
         (4.4325) 
Year 2000 dummy 
 
 
   
                   +  
                   
            109.3776*** 
            (20.538) 
        100.9151*** 
         (14.927) 




                   −  
            9.4767 
            (1.376) 
        -46.5424*** 
        (-6.248) 
Year 2002 dummy 
 
 
   
                   −  
            -28.5503*** 
            (-4.447) 
        -80.2079*** 
        (-11.395) 
Mean of Dependent Variable: 
Delinquency rates (%) of automobile loans; not log 
(Std.Dev.) 
                                   1.9880% 




            0.1444            0.1448 
Breusch-Pagan LM Statisitc for Random Effects Model;  
F (11,25116) for Fixed Effects Model 
 
           8972.52            386.67*** 
Number of counties 
 
 
             3,141              3,141 
Number of Observations 
 
 
            25,128             25,128 
Note: 1) Figures in parentheses are z-statistics and t-statistics   
          2) ***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level, *: significant at 10% level 
          3) High Breusch-Pagan LM Statisitc favors random effects model against OLS model.  
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